Comment

Michael G. Smith
How to restore Australia’s national security

A new word has recently been added to Australia’s Macquarie Dictionary, which means it can be used officially in our lexicon – even by the ABC. “Enshittification” is self-explanatory. Coined to describe the modus operandi of the high-tech IT sector, the word certainly also applies to Australia’s current national security policies.

Enshittification works in three phases: users are attracted by a product’s apparent benefits, are then locked into dependency and subsequently have limited cost-effective options to switch to or opt out. Arguably, this is where the Australian people have landed with their national security prospects. Successive governments have made huge decisions in the absence of public and parliamentary consultation and debate.

The enshittification of Australia’s national security is evident across three related dimensions.

The first is the growing geostrategic contest between the United States as our major security partner and China as our major trading partner. This tension has been evident for decades but was manageable when the US was the undisputed pre-eminent power in the Indo-Pacific. There is near-universal agreement that the security situation is now the most unstable since World War II, yet recent Australian governments have asserted that China’s military expansion represents a threat to Australia without providing a coherent explanation of the reasons why our major trading partner may want to attack or threaten us.

Unfortunately, these same Australian governments have failed since 2013 to provide a comprehensive national security strategy that reflects the interests and priorities of Australian society. Even our National Security College at the Australian National University, funded largely by government, has not mustered the courage to prepare a draft national security strategy for public consultation. In the absence of a comprehensive national security strategy, our current defence minister enthusiastically proceeded with an “in-house” defence review, the results of which are hardly fit for purpose. Its “deterrence by denial” further embeds the Australian Defence Force as a component of the US military, at the very time that America’s influence in Asia and the Indo-Pacific is in decline.

The American-led rules-based international order has frayed, not least due to the capriciousness of our preferred ally. The casualties have been Australia’s wavering commitment to international law, humanitarian intervention and the protection of civilians, nuclear nonproliferation, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and sustainable development.

All this is reflected in the demise of our diplomacy and our lack of ambition to understand and to embrace Asia. Sadly, our political leaders still prefer the Anglosphere. The very worst outcome for Australia would be to become involved in any military conflict against China, or to give China any reason to threaten or target us. Nevertheless, this is the course our political leaders are choosing – extreme and dangerous enshittification.

Our political leaders must accept the new geopolitical realities. We need to learn how to coexist in a multipolar world where China, and then India and Indonesia, are the predominant Asian powers. Our security is in Asia. Our national prosperity and wellbeing are tied to Asia. Our sovereignty and agency are severely degraded by continuing to invest in a self-defeating relationship with the US based on a policy to contain and dominate China. We need to invest more purposefully in the United Nations, as our major ally abandons the very organisation it was instrumental in establishing.

The second dimension of enshittification is the proposition that the purchase of eight nuclear-powered submarines is essential to our national security. This monumental AUKUS decision, conceived in secret, impacts our security for generations to come. At a minimum estimated cost of $368 billion, AUKUS is the largest transfer of sovereign wealth in Australia’s history, with no guarantee the submarines will ever be delivered and optimised for Australia’s primary defence needs.

Currently, we are trapped in an expensive nightmare. Little wonder that a poll from The Australia Institute last month showed fewer than half of respondents thought AUKUS was in the country’s best interests, or made us safer. The same poll found only 8 per cent of Australians thought our values were aligned with Trump’s America, and only 16 per cent believed the US was a “very reliable” security ally.

These submarines are not designed to defend Australia but rather to contain or dominate China as part of the US military arsenal. Defence Minister Richard Marles believes AUKUS will make us “interchangeable” rather than just “interoperable” with the US – clearly a suboptimal result for our sovereignty and, perhaps, a legitimate reason for China to consider targeting Australia.

There are better – more affordable and less provocative – ways to defend Australia. We ought to prioritise diplomatic and military work with regional countries to retain a nuclear-free zone of peace under the Rarotonga Treaty, and to mitigate the existential threats from nuclear proliferation and climate disruption. Clearly, we need to recalibrate our alliance with the US, particularly under President Donald Trump’s erratic leadership. Like our friends in South-East Asia and the South Pacific, we need a hedging strategy that recognises the limits and dangers of over-reliance on America.

The third dimension of enshittification is the Force Posture Agreement and associated initiatives that provide America with military and intelligence bases on our soil, in our seas and through our airspace. The costs and benefits of these arrangements remain unexplained. What controls, if any, prevent the US from transiting and storing nuclear weapons in Australia, or using them offensively from Australia? What provisions have been made for civilian shelters? Can US nuclear weapons be stored safely? How will highly enriched nuclear waste from AUKUS submarines be stored safely, when neither the US nor the United Kingdom has resolved this critical question after many years?

Our political leaders serve the people, supposedly. Their top responsibility is to assure the security of their constituents. They don’t do this well, largely because our parliamentary system does not easily facilitate this. The decisions of war and peace, the strategies that determine our security, the force structure we have and need, and the resilience required of our national infrastructure, resides with a national security committee of cabinet, devoid of proper public and parliamentary consultation, never held accountable, and highly influenced by pro-US lobbyists and intelligence analysts.

US president Dwight D. Eisenhower warned about the military-industrial complex. It is a key agent of enshittification. Rather than consulting with allies, they decide and tell us what we need to enhance our national security. Given the poor record of military interventions by successive Australian governments – such as in Vietnam (1962-73), East Timor (1975), Afghanistan (2001-21) and Iraq (2003-09) – we seem to be slow learners.

So what can be done to improve our national security, to shore up our sovereignty and to contribute more purposefully to conflict prevention? An obvious first step is to abandon our fears and demonstrate our agency as a substantial power in a multipolar world. We need a comprehensive national peace and security strategy that links and prioritises domestic, regional and international circumstances – a strategy that highlights climate disruption and nuclear proliferation as existential threats. We need to urgently recalibrate our alliance with the US to reflect mutual interests, acknowledging that we can no longer rely on it as the cornerstone of our security.

We must finally dismiss the UK as a credible security partner – it is fully preoccupied and stretched in its immediate region and since 19o4 has proved progressively irrelevant as our security provider. Clearly, AUKUS will not reverse this reality.

We need an ADF that is affordable, fit for purpose, technologically adept, balanced and integrated to support and work with civilian agencies and civil society. An ADF that optimises our greatest strength: our geography. One that is not antagonistic to other countries, but demonstrably engaged and professional. One backed by a practical mobilisation plan (which does not currently exist). One that is able to work collegiately with countries in our region, and with the Australian Federal Police, to mitigate climate disruption, contribute to humanitarian and disaster relief, and support conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

None of this is easy, but it is required, achievable and affordable. We will need, however, to demand more from our elected representatives. National peace and security must be a priority for all of our politicians. Most importantly, Australians must demand an independent public inquiry to articulate our views on the priorities to better secure this country’s security and prosperity. We need a new approach, and to set a new course. In short, we need to stop the enshittification of our national security.

This article was first published in the print edition of The Saturday Paper on December 6, 2025 as "How to restore Australia’s national security".

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